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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH# 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
STEVEN RAY JAMES, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
JUPIgDJCTjQN ANP NATURE QF THE CASE 
This is an interlocutory appeal from pretrial orders in 
a capital homicide case charged in the First District Court. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code 
Ann. S 77-35-26 (2)(c)(Supp. 1987). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether defendant's right to a fair trial will be 
jeopardized by the use of a prior conviction as an aggravating 
circumstance to be proven in the guilt phase of his trial for 
first degree murder. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying defendant's pretrial motion for a change of venue where 
the motion was premature because defendant presented no evidence 
that the potential jurors have been exposed to the allegedly 
prejudicial media coverage and where extensive voir dire of 
potential jurors is a viable means to uncover any potential 
prejudice. 
Case No. 870306 
Priority 1 
3. Whether defendant may raise for the first time in 
his brief on this discretionary appeal, the trial court's denial 
of his pretrial motion for a survey of a random sample of the 
residents of Cache and Box Elder counties at county expense where 
he did not request permission to appeal this issue* 
Alternatively, whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying defendant's motion when the trial court offered to permit 
extensive voir dire of a large pool of potential jurors* 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant is charged with the first degree murder of 
his son in the First District Court, Cache County, State of Utah. 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the 
aggravating circumstance supporting the first degree murder 
charge and a motion for a change of venue due to prejudicial 
pretrial publicity. Judge VeNoy Christofferson denied these 
motions. 
Defendant petitioned this Court for permission to 
appeal the interlocutory orders on the motion to dismiss the 
aggravating circumstance and the motion for a change of venue. 
The State concurred in the petition and this Court granted the 
interlocutory appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The State agrees with the statement of facts set out in 
defendant's brief. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Defendants prior conviction for a crime of 
violence is an element of first degree murder and there is no 
constitutional infirmity in admitting this evidence to prove an 
element of the crime. Defendants fear of prejudice can be 
adequately protected by a cautionary jury instruction. 
2. Defendants motion for a change of venue due to 
pretrial publicity was properly denied because it was premature. 
The test is whether any of the actual jurors are actually 
irrevocably prejudiced against defendant and unable to give him a 
fair trial. Until the potential jurors are questioned, the trial 
court acted reasonably in denying the motion. 
3. Surveys of the community at large are not 
necessarily accurate predictions of the ability to provide 
defendant with a fair trial. Moreover# the trial court did not 
deny the motion but told defendant that he could present further 
evidence in support of it and, therefore, there is no final order 
from which defendant may appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE CHARGED UNDER 
UTAH CODE ANN. §76-5-202(1)(h) IS 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND WILL NOT DENY DEFENDANT 
HIS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
Defendant is charged with murder in the first degree in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-202(1) (Supp. 1987) in that he 
intentionally or knowingly caused the death of his son, Steven 
Ray James, and that he was previously convicted of a felony 
involving the use or threat of violence to a person. Defendant 
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complains on appeal that S 76-5-202(1) (h) will interfere with his 
constitutional right to a fair trial. Specifically, defendant 
argues that notice of prior convictions read to a jury as part of 
the charging information before presentation of any evidence will 
be prejudicial because of the tendency of the jury to convict 
because he is a 'bad person1 rather than because he is proved 
guilty of Capital Homicide. 
Section 76-5-202(1)(h) provides that: 
(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in 
the first degree if the actor intentionally 
or knowingly causes the death of another 
under any of the following circumstances: 
(h) The actor was previously convicted of 
first or second degree murder or of a felony 
involving the use or threat of violence to a 
person. For the purpose of this paragraph an 
offense committed in another jurisdiction, 
which if committed in Utah would be 
punishable as first or second degree murder, 
is deemed first or second degree murder. 
Thus, a prior conviction of first or second degree murder or of a 
felony involving the use or threat of violence to a person is an 
element of first degree murder. 
The purpose of subsection (h) is stated simply in the 
commentary to the Model Penal Code: 
Perhaps the strongest popular demand for 
capital punishment arises where the defendant 
has a history of violence. Prior conviction 
of a felony involving violence to the person 
suggests two inferences supporting escalation 
of sentence: first, that the murder reflects 
the character of the defendant rather than 
any extraordinary aspect of the situation, 
and second, that the defendant is likely to 
prove dangerous to life on some future 
occasion. Thus, prior conviction of a 
violent felony is included as a circumstance 
that may support imposition of the death 
penalty. 
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Model Penal Code § 210.6 commentary at 136 (1980) 
The State acknowledges that evidence of prior crimes is 
generally presumed prejudicial and "absent a reason for the 
admission of the evidence other than to show criminal 
disposition, the evidence is excluded." State v. Saunders, 699 
P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985). However, "[elvidence of prior crimes 
is admissible if the evidence is relevant to prove a specific 
element of the crime for which a defendant is on trial." State 
v, Pacheco, 712 P.2d 192, 195 (1985), cert, denied, U.S. , 
107 S. Ct. 64 (1986). Where the Legislature has chosen to have 
the jury consider the circumstances in the guilt phase of the 
trial, this Court should find that the statute is constitutional 
since the Legislature has the duty to define crimes. State v. 
Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 36-7 (Feb. 3, 1988). 
Defendant relies upon three Utah cases wherein this 
Court found that due process was violated where the jury was 
allowed to consider prejudicial prior conviction evidence; e.g., 
State Vt geunflerSr 699 P.2d 738 (Utah 1985); State v. McCumber, 
622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980); State v. Gottfrey. 598 P.2d 1325 (Utah 
1979). However, in none of those cases, unlike the present case, 
was a prior conviction an element of the crime with which the 
defendant was charged. Because defendants conviction involving 
a crime of violence is an element of first degree murder, a valid 
reason exists for admission of the evidence, and the cases cited 
by defendant are simply inapplicable. 
Defendant claims that Utah is the only state which 
permits the use of prior convictions to be considered as an 
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aggravating circumstance in the guilt phase of a capital trial. 
Howeverf both Alabama and Oregon provide for the use of prior 
convictions in the guilt phase of a capital trial. 
Ala. Code S 13A-5-40(a)(13) (1975) provides: 
(a) The following are capital offenses: • • • 
(13) Murder by a defendant who has been 
convicted of any other murder in the 20 years 
preceding the crime; . . . . 
In Arthur v. State, 472 So. 2d 650 (Ala. Cr. App. 
1985), overruled on other grounds. 472 So. 2d 665 (Ala. 1985), 
the defendant complained that the inclusion of a prior offense as 
an element of first degree murder violated due process of law. 
The Arthur court stated that: 
Statutes which enhance the sentence are 
not violative of the due process clause, and 
do not create an unreasonable classification. 
The statute was obviously enacted with a view 
to the protection of society from a certain 
class of criminal with the belief that a 
hardened criminal needed more severe 
punishment • • • • 
Furthermore, the section does not 
deprive the appellant of due process of law 
because it requires the use of a prior 
conviction in the indictment • • • • 
Moreover, the aggravating circumstances 
constitute an element of the capital offense 
and are required to be averred in the 
indictment, and must be proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The aggravating 
circumstances must be set forth in the 
indictment because the State is required to 
give the accused notice that a greater 
penalty is sought to be inflicted than for a 
first offense. 
(citations omitted). I£. at 657-58. 
Or. Rev. Stat. S 163.095(1)(c) (Repl. 1985) provides 
that the crime is aggravated murder if: 
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"[t]he defendant committed murder after 
having been convicted previously in any 
jurisdiction of any homicide, the elements of 
which constitute the crime of murder as 
defined in ORS 163.115 or manslaughter in the 
first degree as defined in ORS 163.118." 
In State v. Earp, 69 Or. App. 365, 686 P.2d 437 (1984), 
cert, denied 691 P.2d 483 (Or. 1984), the defendant argued that 
the court erred in admitting evidence of his previous conviction 
to prove murder in the first degree. The court stated that: 
[i]t is apparent that, in order to prove 
defendant's guilt of aggravated murder in 
this case, it was necessary to prove 
defendant's prior conviction for first degree 
murder. Thus, evidence of the prior crime is 
not only relevant it is material to proof of 
the crime charged, and was not introduced to 
show defendant's criminal propensity. 
Although the prejudicial impact on a 
defendant in a murder case of having the 
jurors know that he committed first degree 
murder previously is strong, the defendant 
may avoid that problem by stipulating to the 
prior conviction* • • • • 
Earp. 686 P.2d at 439. 
The Earp court further relied upon the holding in 
Soencer v. Texas. 385 U.S. 554 (1967) wherein the defendant 
claimed that admission of the prior conviction during the guilt 
determination phase of the trial offended the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantee of due process: 
The Supreme Court rejected the 
contention, stating that the admission of 
that type of evidence could be justified by 
the State's valid governmental interest in 
enforcing greater penalties against habitual 
* Oregon statutory law provides that the defendant has the choice 
of stipulating to the existence of his prior conviction or of 
having evidence of that conviction admitted in evidence. See Or. 
Rev. Stat S 163.103 (Repl. 1985). 
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offenders and that the jury is expected to 
follow limiting instructions. The court 
recognized that there might be other less 
intrusive ways of enforcing enhanced penalty 
provisions, such as a bifurcated trial, but 
stated that the failure to adopt an 
alternative procedure did not change the 
constitutional result. 
EALB. 686 P.2d at 440.2 See also State v. Danielson, 719 P.2d 44 
(Or. App. 1986), cert, denied 723 P.2d 325 (Or. 1986) 
(reaffirming Earp)• 
Defendant argues that the only remedy for the alleged 
prejudicial effect of this evidence is reduction of his charge to 
second degree murder. On the contrary, there are alternative 
remedies that will protect defendant from the potential prejudice 
he fears while protecting the valid state interest in enhancing 
the degree of the crime for persons who have previously 
demonstrated violent behavior and who have failed to conform 
their behavior to the law after their prior experience with the 
judicial system. 
First, the jury may be instructed that defendant's 
prior conviction may only be considered as aggravation and not 
proof that defendant murdered his son. They may be specifically 
admonished not to consider the fact of his prior conviction 
unless they first find that he intentionally and knowingly killed 
his son. 
2 it is interesting to note that Spencer was reaffirmed in 
Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438, n. 6 (1983), a case 
cited by defendant for the proposition that no cases exist 
addressing the present issue. 
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In an analogous setting the Court of Appeals of 
Washingtonf in State v. Lindamood, 39 Wash. App. 517, 693 P.2d 
753 (1985), considered the potential impact on a jury of 
admission of a prior conviction for burglary. Defendant was 
charged with first degree murder with burglary as an aggravating 
circumstance. At trial, his recent conviction for burglary was 
admitted. The Court held there was very little likelihood that 
the jury would be influenced by the prior conviction when 
deciding the issue of premeditation in a murder case. 
Defendant further argues that his prior conviction is 
inadmissible under the rules of evidence and State v. Banney. 717 
P.2d 1325 (Utah 1986). His argument is inapplicable because the 
prior conviction is not offered to impeach defendants 
credibility under Rule 609, but to prove an element of first-
degree murder. It is also not offered under any of the 
circumstances governed by Rule 404. Simply, defendant's prior 
conviction will not be presented to the jury to show his 
character in order to prove that he committed the act charged, 
but merely to elevate the degree of the offense. A cautionary 
instruction will eliminate the potential for prejudice that 
defendant fears. 
Alternatively, if this Court finds that admission of 
the evidence will unfairly prejudice defendant even with a 
cautionary instruction, defendant could stipulate to the 
aggravating circumstance of a prior conviction of a crime of 
violence in exchange for the State not offering the prior 
conviction at the guilt phase, except as impeachment. Such an 
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approach has been adopted in Oregon. In State v. Earp, 69 Or. 
Ap. 365, 686 P.2d 437 (1984), the defendant was charged with 
aggravated murder based on a prior conviction for homicide. 
Similar to Utah's scheme, the Oregon statute requires proof of 
the prior conviction as an element of aggravated murder. In 
addition, the Oregon law permits the defendant to stipulate to 
the prior conviction which would not then be revealed to the jury 
at trial. 
Notably, in Earp* the defendant refused to stipulate to 
his prior conviction and it was admitted at trial. The Oregon 
Court held that, although its admission might be prejudicial, the 
prior conviction was an essential element of aggravated murder 
that must be proven. The Court stressed that Earp had the 
opportunity to neutralize any potential prejudice by stipulating 
to the fact of his prior conviction and preclude the jury from 
hearing that evidence. 
In the present case, if this Court is concerned about 
the potential for prejudice arising from the introduction of 
defendant's prior conviction, it may offer defendant the 
compromise of a stipulation to his prior conviction. Under that 
circumstance, the State would agree not to offer any evidence at 
the guilt phase regarding the prior conviction, except for 
impeachment purposes. The stipulation would take effect only if 
the jury convicts defendant of an intentional and knowing murder. 
At that point, the jury would be informed of the aggravating 
circumstance of a prior conviction and would be asked to make a 
finding consistent with the stipulation. 
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While the State urges the Court to find that 
introduction of defendants prior conviction as an element of the 
crime will not unfairly prejudice him, if this Court determines 
that neither a cautionary instruction nor a stipulation would 
protect defendant from potential prejudice, this Court may adopt 
a bifurcated approach under its general rulemaking authority 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-4 (1987), where the jury would not 
initially be presented with evidence of defendant's prior 
conviction. See State v. Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 48-9 (Feb. 
3, 1988) (Zimmerman, J., concurring in result). If the jury 
finds defendant guilty of an intentional and knowing killing, 
they may then be instructed on the aggravating circumstance and 
return to deliberate its existence or nonexistence. 
This approach would comport with the policy of this 
Court to construe statutory provisions whenever possible to avoid 
invalidating them on constitutional grounds. Greaves v. State, 
528 P.2d 805, 806-07 (Utah 1974). This Court has previously 
acted to fill constitutional voids resulting from the enactment 
of legislation which omitted certain key provisions fundamental 
to the protection of a defendant's rights in a capital 
proceeding. In State v. Lafferty. 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 57, 69 (Jan. 
11, 1988), this Court imposed a requirement that juries be 
instructed to find that previously uncharged crimes used at 
penalty phase be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. In State v. 
Hftfid, 649 P.2d 71 (Utah 1982), the Court construed § 76-3-207, to 
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt at the penalty phase of a 
capital case, even though no specific burden of persuasion had 
been provided by the Legislature. 
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Finallyf defendant asserts that S 76-5-202(1)(h) limits 
the use of a foreign conviction as an aggravating circumstance to 
first or second degree murder. Defendants interpretation 
strains the plain meaning of the statute and does not comport 
with sound public policy considerations. The sentence to which 
defendant refers appears merely to clarify that it is the Utah 
definition of first and second degree murder that applies rather 
than that of the foreign jurisdiction. It in no way limits# 
however, the aggravating circumstance in the way defendant 
suggests. It is the fact of defendant's previous violence and 
previous opportunity to reform upon which the aggravation rests. 
To hold that persons who have previously been convicted in 
foreign jurisdictions of crimes of violence are less culpable 
than persons convicted of the same crimes in Utah is illogical. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS 
DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE. 
Defendant asserts that the pretrial publicity in his 
case has been so massive and prejudicial that it will 
presumptively deny him an impartial jury. He refers this Court 
to a number of news articles and television reports to support 
his argument. Initially, it is important to note that the trial 
court's ruling on this issue should be sustained unless it was an 
abuse of discretion. State v. Bishop. 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 18 
(Feb. 3, 1988). The trial court, however, properly exercised its 
discretion in this case. 
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The mere demonstration that some dissemination of news 
thought to be prejudicial to a defendant has occurred does not 
normally entitle him to prevail on a motion for change of venue. 
State v, Lafferty. 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 57, 63 (Jan. 11, 1988). 
State v. Wood. 648 P.2d 71, 89 (Utah 1982), cert- denied 459 
U.S. 988 (1982); State v. Pierre. 572 P.2d 1338, 1349-50 (Utah 
1977), cert, denied. 439 U.S. 882 (1978). As noted in Wood: 
"The mere general showing of publicity 
thought to be adverse to a party is not 
sufficient to require a change of venue 
except in the most extraordinary cases. In 
the usual situation, the movant must at least 
make a showing that the allegedly prejudicial 
material reached the veniremen, so that a 
foundation is laid for the possibility of 
actual bias." Northern California 
Pharmaceutical Association Vt United states, 
306 F.2d 379, 383 (9th Cir. 1962). 
648 P.2d at 89 (footnote omitted). In Codianna v. Morris* 660 
P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983), the Court similarly observed: 
An accused can be denied a fair trial 
where the process of news-gathering is 
allowed such a free rein that it intrudes 
into every aspect of a trial and creates a 
"carnival atmosphere" and where the publicity 
is so weighted against the defendant and so 
extreme in its impact that members of the 
jury are encouraged to form strong 
preconceived views of his guilt. Sheppard v. 
Maxwell. 384 U.S. 333, 358, 86 S. Ct. 1507, 
1519, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966). Nevertheless, 
"pretrial publicity—even pervasive, adverse 
publicity—does not inevitably lead to an 
unfair trial." Nebraska Press Association v. 
SlUaUif 427 U.S. 539, 554, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 
2800, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976). 
660 P*2d at 1111. And, the burden is on the defendant to show 
that pretrial news coverage has generated community bias to such 
a degree that the right to a fair and impartial trial has been 
put in jeopardy. Wood. 648 P.2d at 88; Utah R. Crim. P. 29(e) 
(Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-29(e) (1982)). 
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The law concerning inherently prejudicial publicity was 
largely developed in three major United States Supreme Court 
decisions—Sheppard v. Maxwell. 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Est?S Vi 
Texas. 381 U.S. 532 (1965); and Rideau v. Louisiana. 373 U.S. 723 
(1963). For example, in Sheppard the Court stated: 
[Wlhere there is a reasonable likelihood that 
prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent 
a fair trial, the judge should . • . transfer 
it to another county not so permeated with 
publicity. 
384 U.S. at 363. In Pierre, this Court interpreted those cases: 
Concerning Rideau. Estes and Sheppard. the 
Supreme Court in Murphy v. Florida. 421 U.S. 
794 at 799, 95 S. Ct. 2031, at 2036, 44 
L.Ed.2d 589, said that these cases ". . . 
cannot be made to stand for the proposition 
that juror exposure to information about 
. . . news accounts of the crime with which 
he is charged alone presumptively deprives 
the defendant of due process." Rather these 
cases must be resolved taking the totality of 
circumstances into account. 
572 P.2d at 1349-50. For the same reasons the Court did not find 
the refusal to order a change of venue in Pierre, a highly 
publicized case, to be an abuse of discretion, the Court should 
find no error here. A review of this case leads one to the 
identical conclusion that "this is not one of those exceptional 
cases where pretrial publicity exacerbated by State complicity 
encouraged the jurors to form such strong preconceived views of 
defendant's guilt as to be considered inherently prejudicial 
against him." Ei£UL£# 572 P.2d at 1349. £££ alsQ CQdianna* 660 
-14-
P.2d at 1112.3 
Furthermore, Sheppard, £s£££, and ftifleati are all 
distinguishable from the instant case. In Sheppard the defendant 
was examined for five hours without counsel during a three day 
inquest televised live from a high school gymnasium; the three 
Cleveland newspapers published the names and addresses of the 
jurors exposing them to expressions of opinion from cranks and 
friends; the prosecution made evidence available to the news 
media which was inadmissible and never offered at trial, and even 
the press in outside States made comments that it would be a 
miracle if defendant could receive a fair trial in light of the 
performance by the Cleveland press. In Estes the two-day 
pretrial hearing, the opening and closing arguments of the State, 
and the return of the jury's verdict were all televised. The 
Esi££ Court was concerned about the impact of television on the 
3 Nor does defendant's case represent the "unusual case" like, 
for example, Pamplin v. Mason, 364 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1966), and 
Maine v. Superior Court of Mendocino County, 68 Cal. 2d 375, 66 
Cal. Rptr. 724, 438 P.2d 372 (1968) (both cited by this Court in 
State v. Wood, 648 P.2d at 89 n. 21), where the courts 
demonstrated an increased sensitivity to the effect of community 
bias on the fairness of a trial. In Pamplin* the defendant was a 
civil rights leader in a community of less than 30,000 who had 
been charged with aggravated assault upon a local police officer 
committed after he had been arrested in the first racial 
demonstration ever staged in the community. There were definite 
signs of an intense community hostility toward the defendant. In 
MaiH£# the defendants were strangers in a small community; the 
victims of the crime were prominent members of that community; 
one of the victims was the object of community-wide concern and 
interest; newspaper publicity included references to a purported 
confession by one of the defendants; and finally, the two 
opposing counsel were political opponents in an upcoming 
election. Clearly, a cumulation of unusual circumstances 
comparable to those in Pamplin and Mains, does not exist in the 
community where defendant will be tried. 
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jurors, on the testimony in the trial, and on the defendant. The 
Court also indicated that the presence of television placed 
additional responsibilities on the Judge. In Rideau a film of 
defendant's confession was shown on television to approximately 
106,000 viewers in a community with a population of approximately 
150,000 people. 
At the very least, defendant's motion is premature 
since none of the actual potential jurors has been examined on 
the issue. The test is whether any jurors are actually 
prejudiced against defendant by the media coverage, Bishop, 75 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 19. The trial court generously offered to call 
in a substantial pool from which to select a jury (T. dtd. 1-29-
87 at 17) and it is reasonable for the court to attempt to select 
an impartial jury before ordering a change of venue. Defendant 
has not presented evidence that any or all of the potential 
jurors actually viewed or heard the media coverage complained of. 
Even if some potential jurors have formed opinions regarding 
defendant's guilt, they would not necessarily be disqualified if 
they are able to set those opinions aside and decide the case 
based upon the evidence at trial. Lafferty. 73 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
63. 
In fact, defendant's own witnesses who appeared at the 
hearing on the motion did not support defendant's claim. Dr. 
Pitkin admitted that, although he perceived prejudice in some of 
the newscasts, he could not predict with certainty how any 
particular individual would perceive them (T. dtd. 5-26-87 at 
42). Further, Ms. Hobbs, who testified about community efforts 
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to locate defendant's missing son, stated that she believed 
defendant to be innocent until proven guilty. 
Because the potential jurors have yet to be questioned 
on the issue, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying defendants motion at this time. Defendant has not 
established that he will not be able to select a fair, impartial 
jury and the trial court's ruling should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT NEED NOT CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S 
ARGUMENT THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE 
ALLOWED THE SURVEY BECAUSE DEFENDANT DID NOT 
REQUEST PERMISSION TO APPEAL THIS ISSUE. 
Defendant filed a petition with this Court (R. 617-620) 
requesting permission to appeal the trial court's orders denying 
his motion to dismiss the aggravating circumstance and his motion 
for a change of venue. Defendant did not request in the petition 
permission to appeal an order denying his request for a survey of 
potential jurors. In fact, there is no formal motion contained 
in the record nor is there a final order contained in the record 
denying such a motion although there is a transcript dated 
January 29, 1987 wherein such a request was discussed. Further, 
Judge Christofferson indicated that he would not rule on such a 
request until defendant had time to produce authority supporting 
his request (T. dtd. 5/26/87 at 16-17, 27). Because there is no 
final order denying permission for a survey and defendant did not 
request permission to appeal from such an order, this Court 
should not consider this issue, gee South Salt Lake v. Burton, 
718 P.2d 405 (Utah 1986) (unsigned minute entry not final order 
for purposes of appeal). 
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Even if defendant had properly raised this issue, he 
would not be entitled to relief in this Court. Defendant 
requested that he be allowed to conduct at county expense a poll 
of a sample of the residents of Cache and Box Elder counties to 
determine the general feelings of the community at large on the 
subject of defendant's guilt or innocence or, at least, on the 
subject of pretrial publicity. Such a poll would not necessarily 
have reflected the attitudes of the actual potential jurors to be 
called in this case. State v. Bishop, 75 Utah Adv. Rep. 9, 18 
(Feb. 3, 1988). What is relevant, are the prejudices and biases 
of the actual jurors and not those of the community at large. 
!£. Only those jurors who hold opinions so strong that they are 
unable to set those opinions aside are to be disqualified from 
the jury. Utah Code Ann. $ 77-35-18(e)(14) (1982). Because 
defendant's informal request was not aimed at reaching the 
specific biases of the actual potential jurors, it would have 
provided evidence of only minimal value to the trial court and it 
was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the 
request absent specific authority supporting it. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court 
to affirm the trial court's interlocutory orders and to remand 
this case for an immediate trial on the merits. 
DATED this 7// day of ''I'/frtA , 1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
SANDRA L. SJOGREN / / 
Assistant Attorney General 
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